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Analyzing the gaze of other people is a behavior that is 
present virtually from birth (e.g., Moore & Dunham, 1995; 
Vecera & Johnson, 1995). The language of the eyes is a 
complex one, communicating a current emotional state 
highly efficiently to other members of the social group 
(Argyle & Cook, 1976; Emery, 2000). Furthermore, the 
direction of gaze indicates the current attentional state. 
That is, the direction of gaze indicates what object a con-
specific is currently interested in. Observing a shift in eye 
gaze results in a corresponding fast and obligatory shift 
of attention in the observer (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999), to align his or her own 
attention system with that of the other person—that is, 
joint attention.
A great deal of research has already been informative 
about the nature of gaze-evoked shifts of attention (e.g., 
Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2004; Friesen & King-
stone, 2003; Frischen & Tipper, 2004). However, it is pos-
sible that observing another individual’s gaze shift might 
not just activate the observer’s attention system into the 
same state, where the observer shifts attention toward the 
same location, but might also trigger simulation of other 
processes associated with gaze direction. For example, 
when one looks at an object, it not only becomes the focus 
of one’s attention, but also reflects preference formation, 
as gaze tends to settle on objects that one decides that 
one likes (Shimojo, Simion, Shimojo, & Scheier, 2003). 
Indeed, 4-year-olds understand this link between gaze di-
rection and object preference (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, 
Karmiloff-Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995). Thus, when one 
looks toward an object, one tends to like it more than an 
object that one looks away from. The critical question we 
ask is whether similar emotional responses are activated 
in an individual who observes another person look toward 
or away from objects: Do participants prefer objects that 
are looked at by other people (Experiment 1)? One might 
expect such an effect to be absent when attention is cued 
by an arrow (Experiment 2).
In this study, participants saw a face in the center of the 
screen that could look left or right. This face was irrel-
evant to the participant’s task of object categorization, so 
any effects due to gaze direction would be automatically 
evoked and be nonstrategic. The critical manipulation was 
that for each participant, there were two versions of 36 
household objects, identical except for color. One version 
of each object would be looked at by the face every time 
it appeared, whereas the face would look away from the 
other (differently colored) object every time it appeared. It 
was predicted that the participants would like the looked-
at object more than the objects never looked at. This find-
ing would lend support to the idea that the gaze behavior 
of others can influence the way we evaluate visual stimuli 
in the environment.
ExpErimEnt 1
method
participants. Twenty-four adults (5 of them male) volunteered 
for this study. The mean age was 20.8 years (SD 5 1.31 years), and 
all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants were 
recruited from the School of Psychology’s undergraduate partici-
pant panel, gave informed consent, and received course credit for 
 participation.
Stimuli. The stimuli were presented approximately 60 cm away 
from the participant. Forty unfamiliar faces with neutral or mod-
erately positive facial expressions were used as cue stimuli. These 
faces were framed in windows measuring 9.8 3 14.0 cm. The faces 
themselves varied between 6.3 and 7.6 cm in width and between 8.5 
and 11.5 cm in height. Three versions of each face were produced, 
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when we see another person look somewhere, we automatically attend to the same location in 
space. this joint attention emerges early in life and has a great impact on social interactions in devel-
opment and in everyday adult life. the direction of another’s gaze indicates what object is of current 
interest, which may be the target for a subsequent action. In this study, we found that objects that 
are looked at by other people are liked more than objects that do not receive the attention of other 
people (experiment 1). this suggests that observing averted gaze can have an impact on the affective 
appraisals of objects in the environment. this liking effect was absent when an arrow was used to cue 
attention (experiment 2). this underlines the importance of other people’s interactions with objects 
for generating our own impressions of such stimuli in the world.
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one with gaze straight ahead, one with the pupils averted leftward, 
and another with the pupils averted rightward. The eye regions were 
approximately 0.5 cm high and varied between 4.0 and 5.0 cm in 
width. The pupils measured approximately 0.5 3 0.5 cm. Which 
face produced the cue on each trial was randomized. The fixation 
cross, which preceded each trial, measured 0.8 3 0.8 cm.
The target stimuli consisted of 36 household items, 18 of which 
could generally be found in the garage (household tools—e.g., a 
screwdriver, a pair of pliers, an axe, and a saw). The other 18 were 
kitchen items (e.g., a kettle, cutlery, a mug, and a saucepan). These 
stimuli could appear in one of four colors: red, blue, green, or yel-
low. The hue of the main section of each object was manipulated in 
Adobe Photoshop. Thus, there were a total of 144 possible target 
stimuli that could appear in their original orientation or flipped about 
the vertical axis. The targets were presented so that the centers of the 
targets were 14 cm from the center of the screen. The targets varied 
between 3.6 and 10.5 cm in width and between 1.5 and 7.4 cm in 
height. For the recording of preference ratings of the stimuli, a chart 
was presented, with the message “How much did you like that ob-
ject?” at the top of the screen and with a column of numbers from 9 
to 1, headed by the words “Like very much” at the top and the words 
“Don’t like at all” at the bottom of the screen.
Design. The cuing factor was whether the target was looked at 
(congruent), or looked away from (incongruent). The manner in 
which the targets (kitchen/garage items) were presented to each par-
ticipant was tightly controlled. Although there were four colors that 
each object could appear in, each participant would see only two ex-
amples of each stimulus. To compensate for any problems for which 
the participants might simply rate objects in their favorite color more 
highly, we randomized which color was selected for each target, for 
each participant. Furthermore, which exemplar of each colored target 
would serve as the consistently congruent item and the consistently 
incongruent item across six exposures was also randomly assigned.
procedure. In the standard cuing trials of Blocks 1 to 5, the 
participants, with their head position supported by a chinrest, were 
told to fixate the fixation cross, to refrain from eye movements, to 
ignore the uninformative gaze cue, and to respond to the target as 
quickly as possible. At the start of each trial, a fixation cross would 
appear for 600 msec. Then a face would appear, with eyes gazing 
straight ahead, for 1,500 msec; then, 500 msec before target onset, 
the eyes would move to the left or the right. After 2,500 msec, or 
after response, the screen would go blank for 1,500 msec before 
the next trial (see Figure 1A). At response, a tone was sounded to 
give feedback on performance (a bell for correct and a buzzer for 
incorrect/timeout). The participants used the “h” key and the space 
bar to respond to the category of the target object. Whether “h” cor-
responded to garage or kitchen items was counterbalanced between 
participants. After 16 practice trials (using the same cue faces but 
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Figure 1. (A) illustration of the time course of two sample trials. At the top, the red kettle 
is congruent; at the bottom, the blue version of this item is incongruent. throughout the 
experiment, this cuing relationship was maintained. thus, in this example, the red kettle was 
always gazed at in each of the six exposures. the cue face could be one of 40, and the colors 
of the target items could also be green or yellow; any of these colors could be the congruent 
or the incongruent item for different participants. (B) illustration of the time course of the 
subsequent ratings screen appearing after response in the final (sixth) block only. in Experi-
ment 2, a simple arrow replaced the face.
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different target objects), the participants completed five blocks of 72 
trials, in which each target was viewed once in each block.
In the final (sixth) rating block, the procedure changed. The par-
ticipants were now informed that following their target categoriza-
tion response, a blank screen would be presented (500 msec), fol-
lowed by a ratings screen (see Figure 1B). They were required to 
rate the item they had just responded to, so that higher scores were 
given to objects that they preferred. They were told to verbally state 
a number from 1 to 9, to be recorded by the experimenter. After 
their liking rating, another blank screen (500 msec) preceded the 
next trial. In total, therefore, the participants completed 432 trials of 
the gaze-cuing procedure, being exposed six times to 36 congruent 
targets and six times to 36 incongruent targets. They rated each of 
these 72 targets once in the final (sixth) block.
results
Gaze cuing. Accuracy in categorizing the targets was 
95.8%. For errors, the effect of cuing was nonsignificant 
in the standard blocks [t(23) 5 20.932, p 5 .36] and the 
rating block [t(23) 5 0.632, p 5 .53]. Analysis of median 
reaction times (RTs) revealed the standard gaze-cuing ef-
fect, with RTs being shorter to congruent than to incon-
gruent targets (see Table 1). This was significant in the 
standard blocks [t(23) 5 2.211, p 5 .019, one-tailed] and 
marginal in the ratings block [t(23) 5 1.701, p 5 .051, 
one-tailed].
Object ratings. The replication of gaze-cuing effects 
was of secondary importance in this experiment. The 
central issue was whether this gaze shift would produce 
a higher rating for objects that were looked at than for 
objects that were not looked at. Immediately after the sixth 
exposure to a target item, the participants rated the item 
from 1 to 9. Ratings from items that were correctly re-
sponded to in the final block were compared for congru-
ent and incongruent items. Crucially, there was a signifi-
cant cuing effect [t(23) 5 4.64, p , .001; r 5 .49], with 
the items that were consistently looked at throughout the 
experiment being rated more preferable (M 5 4.74, SD 5 
0.73, range 5 3.15) than were the items consistently 
looked away from (M 5 4.59, SD 5 0.78, range 5 3.48). 
Although the overall difference was small, the analysis 
demonstrated that the effect was highly reliable, being 
shown by 22 of 24 participants (see Figures 2 and 3). The 
liking effect was also significant when analyzed across 
materials, rather than across participants [t(35) 5 2.63, 
p 5 .013; r 5 .30]. Interestingly, the magnitude of a par-
ticipant’s liking effect evoked by the cues did not correlate 
with the magnitude of the participant’s cuing effect (r 5 
2.156, n 5 24, p 5 .46).
Discussion
In this experiment, we investigated whether simply 
observing someone look toward an object that requires a 
response results in a more positive affective appraisal of 
that object than of objects that are not looked at. Along 
with the standard gaze-cuing effect, we found that visual 
objects that consistently appeared in congruent locations 
(i.e., looked at six times out of six appearances) were 
rated as more likable than objects appearing in incongru-
ent locations (i.e., looked away from). This finding is a 
further demonstration of the importance of other people’s 
behavior in determining our beliefs and preferences. In 
this case, subtle behaviors such as another person’s gaze 
shifts, even when they are not relevant to our goals, can 
have significant influences on what we like.
There are two plausible reasons for the liking effect. 
First, the shift of attention in the direction of gaze facili-
tates RTs to congruent items. This perceptual fluency is 
associated with the congruent items; hence, they attract a 
more positive emotional evaluation than do incongruent 
targets (Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). However, 
if the shift of attention per se were associated with the 
evaluation of the item, one would predict that the stronger 
a participant’s shift of attention, the larger the difference 
between the ratings of congruent and incongruent items 
would be. However, as was noted above, there was no hint 
of such a correlation.
The second possible explanation is that the gaze cue 
acts as a social reinforcer for items in the environment. 
That is, our preferences for objects are influenced by the 
preferences that other people display. Since gaze direc-
tion is an excellent indicator of another person’s interest 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1995; Shimojo et al., 2003), it is very 
likely that the objects that they inspect are objects that 
they find attractive and the objects that people avert gaze 
from are unattractive. This alludes to the distinction be-
tween approach and avoid emotional responses to stimuli 
(see Davidson & Irwin, 1999, for a review). If we observe 
someone approach/avoid a stimulus, it will serve us well 
to generate a matching emotional tag to that stimulus. This 
is one of the primary reasons that an eye direction detec-
tor might have evolved in large social groups—to benefit 
table 1 
mean reaction times (rts, in milliseconds) and Error rates  
(As percentages), With Standard Deviations, for Standard and  
rating Blocks in Both Experiments
Standard Blocks Rating Block
RT Errors RT Errors
  Condition  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD  M  SD
Experiment 1 Incongruent 672 92 4.31 3.7 714 127 2.78 3.7
Congruent 663 87 4.75 3.1 692 114 2.20 2.6
Experiment 2 Incongruent 646 67 6.04 3.7 698 108 3.01 3.3
  Congruent  630  61  5.39  3.4  683  101  4.05  3.7
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from other people’s knowledge and behavior by efficiently 
interpreting their behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
A second experiment was therefore conducted in order 
to establish which of these two hypotheses best explains 
the results of Experiment 1. By simply using an arrow cue, 
instead of a gaze cue, the data would lend support to one 
or the other hypothesis. If an arrow cue were to produce 
attentional cuing and a liking effect, it would suggest that 
attention boosts appraisal of objects, whether attention is 
shifted by gaze or otherwise. If, however, an arrow cue 
were to produce cuing but no liking effect, we would have 
confirmed that in this paradigm, objects that other people 
look at receive more positive appraisals than do ones that 
are not looked at, independently of attention.
ExpErimEnt 2
Like gaze cues, arrows shift attention, even when partici-
pants are instructed to ignore them (e.g., Shepherd, Findlay, 
& Hockey, 1986; Tipples, 2002). The cuing effects elicited 
by arrows are very similar to those produced by gaze cues, 
in terms of their time course, magnitude, and sensitivity 
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Figure 2. Bar chart illustrating the average rating (between 1 and 9) 
assigned by the participants to congruent or incongruent garage and 
kitchen items (with standard error bars), for both the experiments. 
Higher ratings indicate that the participants liked the objects more.
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Individual Participants
Figure 3. Bar charts for each experiment, illustrating the rating biases shown by individual participants (in the order 
in which they were recruited). Hence, bars above the x-axis illustrate that a participant rated congruent items higher 
than incongruent items.
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to individual differences (e.g., females show more cuing 
following gaze and arrow cues than males do; Bayliss, di 
Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005). In general, therefore, the atten-
tion shift in this experiment would be similar to that in the 
previous experiment. The critical measure again, however, 
is whether there is a difference between congruent and in-
congruent objects in participant’s ratings of liking.
method
The method for this experiment was identical to that in Experi-
ment 1, except that the gaze cues were replaced with an arrow, 
measuring 6.0 3 2.0 cm, presented in the center of the screen. Ap-
pearing first as a single line for 1,500 msec, two arrow heads ap-
peared 500 msec before target onset, to provide the uninformative 
directional cue. As before, 24 adults (3 of them male) volunteered 
for this experiment. The mean age was 24.2 years (SD 5 4.30), 
and all had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The participants 
were recruited from the School of Psychology’s community par-
ticipant panel, gave informed consent, and received payment for 
 participation.
results
Arrow cuing. Accuracy in categorizing the targets was 
94.4%. Again, there was no effect of cuing on accuracy in 
the standard blocks [t(23) 5 0.343, p 5 .74] or the rat-
ings block [t(23) 5 21.619, p 5 .12]. A cuing effect did 
emerge in the median RT analysis, with RTs being shorter 
to congruent than to incongruent targets in the standard 
[t(23) 5 3.94, p , .001, one-tailed] and ratings [t(23) 5 
1.97, p 5 .031, one-tailed] blocks (see Table 1). Further 
analyses compared the RT effects between the two experi-
ments. The cuing 3 experiment interaction was not sig-
nificant (F , 1).
Object ratings. The participants’ cuing effects in this 
experiment were virtually identical to those in Experi-
ment 1. However, the critical question is whether an arrow 
cue was just as effective as gaze cues at eliciting a differ-
ence in the appraisals of objects that were either congruent 
or incongruent. As one can see from Figure 2, it is clear 
that incongruent objects were liked just as much (M 5 
4.89, SD 5 0.96, range 5 3.99) as congruent objects 
(M 5 4.88, SD 5 0.96, range 5 4.35), when analyzed 
across participants [t(23) 5 0.32, p 5 .75]. Similarly, no 
effect was found when ratings were analyzed across mate-
rials [t(35) 5 0.43, p 5 .67].
A further analysis in which the ratings across the two 
experiments were compared demonstrated that overall rat-
ings across the experiments were not different, since the 
main effect of experiment was nonsignificant [F(1,46) , 1, 
MSe 5 1.61, p 5 .41]. However, most important, the ex-
periment 3 cuing interaction was significant [F(1,46) 5 
7.09, MSe 5 0.023, p 5 .011], confirming the differential 
influence of the two cue types on liking.
Discussion
The results of this second experiment are clear: In the 
case of cuing via arrows, congruent items are not evalu-
ated higher on a liking scale than incongruent items. Since 
both gaze (Experiment 1) and arrow cues (Experiment 2) 
produced similar cuing magnitudes, it is fair to say that 
attention was cued to the same extent in both experiments. 
The failure to replicate higher ratings for congruent ob-
jects in Experiment 2 is, therefore, very striking.1 This 
implies that attentional cuing via a central cue is not suf-
ficient to produce a difference between how much people 
like congruent and incongruent target objects. Rather, it is 
observing another person look at an object that leads to a 
modulation in the affective response to that object.
GEnErAl DiScuSSiOn
It has been well established that we automatically follow 
the direction of another person’s gaze and that we respond 
differently to direct and averted gaze when making per-
sonality judgments of the gazing person (Bayliss & Tip-
per, 2006; Macrae, Hood, Milne, Rowe, & Mason, 2002). 
Here, we demonstrated not only that things that people 
look at are attended to by observers, but also that these 
objects are liked more by observers. This effect is not due 
to the automatic allocation of attention to the looked-at 
object, since an arrow cue, just as effective at cuing atten-
tion, failed to result in a similar affective response. This 
suggests that we use the gaze of others to help us evalu-
ate the potential value of objects in the world. That is, if 
someone looks toward an object, it is because they like it 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1995), but if they look away from 
it, they do not. So, it would benefit us to take on board 
this information and use it to guide and influence our own 
evaluative processes.
Of note in our procedure is that although we presented 
the stimuli six times before we recorded the liking rat-
ing, it is possible that the difference may be present even 
after the first exposure. nevertheless, whether repeated or 
single exposures are sufficient to produce the liking ef-
fects, they have clear real-life applications. For example, 
a core technique of the advertising industry is to repeat 
exposures to products. People (i.e., actors) are used to sell 
products by making the products appear more attractive 
than they otherwise would. It is possible that by ensur-
ing that triadic joint attention episodes are established 
between the actor, product, and consumer, advertisers 
could potentially boost the affective response associated 
with their product. Furthermore, although peripheral cues 
might produce effects different from those presented here 
(cf. Fenske, Raymond, Kessler, Westoby, & Tipper, 2005), 
it is suggested that cues such as arrows are effective in 
ensuring attentional orienting but that, unlike gaze cues, 
they do not guarantee an evaluative consequence. It is im-
portant to note also that all the participants were asked on 
debrief what they felt had influenced their ratings. Their 
answers never involved the cue, focusing instead on color, 
familiarity, and usefulness. This indicates that our use of 
household objects as stimuli prevented the participants 
from successfully “working out” the purpose of the study. 
Hence, their ratings were made naively, and thus it appears 
that the biases shown in Experiment 1 were evoked with-
out the conscious awareness of the participants.
Of course, the effect we present here needs replication 
and extension. Comparing objects that have high, low, or 
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medium levels of preference before the experiment would 
enable the evaluation of the generality of the effect. It is 
likely that objects that one is already enthused or repulsed 
by may be resistant to such manipulations and that only 
the mundane everyday items we presented can be modu-
lated by gaze. Another issue is that we had only congruent 
and incongruent trials in this study. Successfully estab-
lishing an appropriate neutral condition would allow for 
evaluation of the relative influence of increased ratings 
for looked-at objects, as compared with decreased liking 
of incongruent items. Furthermore, since the participants 
responded to the items every time they appeared, what 
effect a gaze cue would have on ratings of objects that are 
not behaviorally relevant (i.e., in a passive-viewing condi-
tion) is an interesting question for further work.
A final issue of note is the role of the face–object pair-
ings in this study. The evaluative conditioning literature 
demonstrates that pairing a pleasant stimulus with a neu-
tral stimulus can result in higher ratings for the neutral 
stimuli, in comparison with neutral stimuli paired with 
unpleasant stimuli (see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 
2001, for a review). In this study, face pleasantness is un-
likely to have had an effect, since the face cue was ran-
domly selected on each trial, so systematic differences in 
the pleasantness of the faces in the cued and the uncued 
conditions are unlikely to account for this result. However, 
observing faces activates neural systems regulating affect 
per se (see Adolphs, 1999, for a review). Perhaps the gen-
erally positive experience of face viewing resulted in an 
activation of affective circuits in Experiment 1, whereas 
Experiment 2 was devoid of these (generally rewarding) 
social stimuli. Future work is planned in which the influ-
ence of facial attractiveness and emotional expression on 
these type of effects (gaze-cuing and liking effects) will be 
systematically investigated. Investigating these issues is 
clearly very important for future research into this effect.
In conclusion, we have demonstrated, in a gaze-cuing 
procedure, that people like objects more when they are 
looked at by another person. This result underlines the 
importance of other people’s gaze behavior in influencing 
our own behavior. This is, therefore, another demonstra-
tion of the flexibility of the person perception systems in 
guiding our social interactions and the consequences of 
those interactions.
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1. An anonymous reviewer suggested that the lack of a ratings effect 
in Experiment 2 may have been due to the fact that Experiment 1 re-
cruited unpaid psychology undergraduates and Experiment 2 recruited 
slightly older, paid participants with no knowledge of psychology. We 
understand the potential influence of such factors in these type of stud-
ies. Hence, we recruited 24 age-matched (M 5 19.7 years, SD 5 1.4) 
participants from the psychology undergraduate panel and replicated Ex-
periment 2. The findings were virtually identical to those with the paid 
participants. Cuing was found in median RTs [t(23) 5 2.99, p 5 .004, 
one-tailed], but not in errors ( p . .18). The ratings for congruent objects 
(M 5 4.82, SD 5 0.55) did not differ from those for incongruent objects 
(M 5 4.80, SD 5 0.51) [t(23) 5 0.372, p 5 .71], and this null effect in-
teracted significantly with the liking effect in Experiment 1 [F(1,46) 5 
4.91, MSe 5 0.021, p 5 .032]; the ratings were not significantly different 
overall between the experiments (F , 1).
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